In this paper we examine the role played by heterogeneity in the popular "connections model" of Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) . We prove that under heterogeneity in values or decay involving only two degrees of freedom, all networks can supported as Nash. Moreover, we show that Nash networks may not always exist. In the absence of decay, neither result can be found in a model with value heterogeneity.
Introduction
The connections model of Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) is one of the most popular models in network theory. In this model an agent acquires information from all the agents she is directly or indirectly linked to and pays a fixed cost for all her direct links. However, the model allows for partial transitivity of resources that an agent obtains. First, the information she obtains from her direct links is weighted by a decay parameter. Indirect links yield still lower benefits in the following mannerfrom those who are two links away the information is weighted by the square of the decay parameter, from those three links away by its cube, and so on. Since information loses value as it travels along a sequence of links, the decay parameter captures the idea that "it is better to have the facts straight from the horse's mouth." Bala and Goyal (2000) studied Nash as well as strict Nash networks for the homogeneous (values, costs of link formation and decay) parameters version of this model.
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In this paper we introduce heterogeneity in the model by first allowing for value heterogeneity, keeping the link cost as well as the decay parameter same for all links. A second version of the model allows for heterogeneity in the decay parameter while keeping values and costs constant across all links. Heterogeneity of players and links arise quite naturally in information networks. For example, some individuals are better informed which makes them more valuable as contacts. This can be understood as heterogeneity of players in the model. Similarly the extent of the communication between pairs of individuals can vary, since it is often easier to communicate with some individuals than with some others. Thus the amount of 1 A decay model for Nash networks has recently been analyzed by Hojman and Szeidl (2008) . In this model, costs of links are homogeneous and linear, while the benefit function is quite general. The authors assume that the benefit function is strictly increasing and concave. Moreover, the benefits from links further away go to zero at some threshold level of distance. The authors find that Nash networks tend to have a core-periphery structure. Due to the nature of their payoff function however, we are unable to compare our results with them. Instead, we restrict attention to the papers mentioned in the introduction which utilize the linear payoff specification of Bala and Goyal (2000) . information acquired will depend on the link(s) through which it travels, allowing us to model this as link heterogeneity. The paper studies the existence and characterization of (strict) Nash networks for these two types of heterogeneity.
Heterogeneity in Nash networks has been studied by Galeotti, Goyal and Kamphorst (2006) and Haller, Kamphorst and Sarangi (2007) . Both these models investigate the consequences of heterogeneity for the full transitivity (or no decay) model of Nash networks with homogeneous parameters introduced to the literature by Bala and Goyal. In the Bala and Goyal model with no decay, each agent pays only for her direct links and is able to acquire the full value of information of all agents she is directly or indirectly linked to. Haller, Kamphorst and Sarangi introduce heterogeneity in the value and cost parameters to study the existence of Nash networks. Galeotti, Goyal and Kamphorst also introduce heterogeneity in values and costs but focus on the characterization of strict Nash networks.
The contribution of this paper to the literature can be summarized in the following manner. When decay and costs are homogeneous while the link between player i and player j provides value V i,j to player i we find that:
1. Nash networks may not always exist. This is in sharp contrast to Haller, Kamphorst and Sarangi who find that in models of full transitivity, value heterogeneity does not lead to non-existence. Non-existence occurs only with cost heterogeneity. However, if we reduce heterogeneity by allowing V i,j = V i , then it turns out that Nash networks always exist. This result is also interesting for another reason. As a corollary it tells us that Nash networks always exist in the homogeneous parameters model of Bala and Goyal (2000) − an issue that these authors had left unresolved in their paper.
2. All networks can be supported as strict Nash networks. This result echoes the full transitivity model of Galeotti, Goyal and Kamphorst with cost heterogeneity which shows that strict Nash networks must be minimal as well as its converse. 2 We know that under full transitivity (regardless of parameters values) with costly link formation, the set of potential strict Nash networks 3 consists of networks without any links that do not provide access to new players. With cost heterogeneity, Galeotti, Goyal and Kamphorst show that the set of strict Nash networks coincides with the set of potential strict Nash networks, i.e., the equilibrium set is maximal. We find that the same is true in our model. Hence with partial transitivity value heterogeneity functions like cost heterogeneity with full transitivity.
3. In general, we find that when we reduce the magnitude of heterogeneity or set The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. Section 3 presents the results on Nash networks in models with decay and heterogeneity.
Model Setup
In this section we define the formal elements of the strategic form network formation Here we focus only on pure strategies. The set of all pure strategies of player i is denoted by G i and consists of 2 n−1 elements. The joint strategy space is given by
Note that there is a one-to-one correspondence between G and the set of all simple directed graphs (that is graphs with no loops and there is at most one directed link from a player i to a player j) or networks with vertex set N .
Namely, to a strategy profile
where E(g) is the set of links which satisfies i j ∈ E(g) iff g i,j = 1. In the sequel, we identify a joint strategy g by its corresponding graph and use the terminology directed graph or network g for it.
Network definitions. The closure of g, denoted by g ∈ G, is defined by and costs c i (g). Hence the payoff of player i in network g is given by
Next we define two types of heterogeneity in networks by introducing costs and different benefit formulations.
(i) Link Costs. Players incur costs only for the links they establish. The cost of each link is assumed to be the same, and the cost of forming links for player i is given by:
with c > 0. In this paper we only use homogeneous costs. Note that in our context heterogeneous costs would not improve anything because (i) they would only increase the set of potential strict Nash networks, and (ii) they would weaken the possibility of existence of Nash networks. This issue is discussed in detail in subsequent sections of the paper (see also Galeotti et al., 2006 for more on this).
(ii) Link Benefits. In the Nash networks setting, decay models were analyzed by Bala and Goyal (2000) who assumed that the value of information, the costs of link formation, and the decay parameter were identical across all players and links.
In other words, they analyzed the case of homogeneous decay. Here we propose two different frameworks to study the interaction between heterogeneity and decay.
We denote by N i (g) = {i}∪{j ∈ N \{i} | there exists a chain in g between i and j}, the set of players that player i can access or "observe" in network g. Since player
i can obtain resources from a player j with whom she is linked due to the chain, it follows that there is two-way flow of information.
Decay with Heterogeneous Players. Here we use the homogeneous decay assumption in conjunction with the heterogeneous players framework of Galeotti,
Goyal and Kamphorst (2006). Information received from j is worth
The benefits function can be written as:
where δ is the decay parameter and d i,j (g) is the geodesic distance in the shortest chain between i and j in g. We set d i,j (g) = ∞ if there is no chain between i and
Decay with Heterogeneous Links. In this model we capture the fact that the quantity of information a link can convey is not the same across all links under decay. In other words, some channels of information or chains are "better" than others.
We measure decay associated with a link i j by the parameter δ i,j ∈ [0, 1]. For this model we retain the symmetry assumption, that is δ i,j = δ j,i . Without loss of generality we assume that the value of the resources of each player V = 1. Given a network g, it is assumed that if player i has formed a link with player j, then she receives information of value δ i,j from j. The benefits of player i in the network g is then given by:
where
Note that this expression fundamentally differs from the previous one because it does not use the geodesic distance between players to determine the value of in-formation obtained.
Observe that in the model with heterogeneous decay, the amount of information that passes through a link between any two players depends on the identity of the players. On the other hand, with heterogeneous values the links between all players have the ability to convey the same amount of information, but the value that is acquired through a link now depends on the identity of the players.
Nash Networks. Given a network g ∈ G, let g −i denote the network that remains when all of player i's links have been removed.
where the symbol ⊕ indicates that g is composed of the union of links in g i and g −i (similarly the symbol is used to indicate removal of links). A strategy g i is a best response of player i to g −i if
. . , g n ) is said to be a Nash network if g i ∈ BR i (g −i ) for each i ∈ N . We define a strict best response and a strict Nash network by replacing "≥" with ">". Note that if g ∈ G is a Nash network, then it must be essential. This follows from the fact that each link is costly, and allows for two-way flow of information regardless of who initiates (and pays for) the link.
Results
In this section we investigate Nash networks in the connections model with heterogeneity.
Decay with Heterogeneous Players
In this section we first examine the existence of Nash networks, then we characterize strict Nash networks. 
Corollary 1 Let the payoff function be the one given in Bala and Goyal (2000, pg.1210). Then a Nash network always exists.

Proposition 2 If the benefits function satisfies equation (3), then a Nash network does not always exist.
Proof. The proof is given through an example. Let N = {1, . . . , 5} be the set of players, and assume that:
These five points provide a list of the players with whom the others have no incentives to form links, as well as those with whom they would like to form links. For example, item 1 implies that player 1 will never form a link with players 3, 4 and 5. Proof. Suppose g is an essential network. Let 
regardless of other links, not initiating the link i j is optimal for agent i. Now let
If player i removes the link i j, then she obtains at most a payoff equal to δ 2 V i,j from player j. It follows that due to the link i j player i obtains marginal benefits equal to at least Since
player k has a incentive to form a link with j and g is not strict Nash.
Not surprisingly Proposition 3 also tells us that in the homogeneous parameters model with decay not every network can be supported as a strict Nash network.
Indeed, it is easy to see that
is always satisfied in the homogeneous model. Therefore, non-connected networks cannot be strict Nash.
In the above proposition we restrict heterogeneity by putting a bound on its magnitude. Now we restrict the heterogeneity by assuming that V i,j = V i . Recall that reducing heterogeneity in this manner has positive implications for the existence of Nash networks. Below we show how it affects the set of strict Nash networks.
Proposition 4 Suppose payoff function satisfies equation (3) and for each player
Then a strict Nash network contains at most one component.
Proof. Suppose g is a strict Nash network and contains two components D and
We have:
Since g is strict Nash, we have
Let g 1 = g ⊕ i j , we have:
Since g is strict Nash, we have ∆ i < 0. We obtain a contradiction since ∆ i ≤ ∆ i .
Proposition 4 shows that when we reduce the heterogeneity by restricting player i to acquire V i from each of the players she observes, not every essential network can be strict Nash. This sharply contrasts with the heterogeneous players case of that when values are given by V i , in a strict Nash network isolated players can also co-exist with a single component.
We suppose that 4ε < δ < c, and δ + 2δ 2 > c. Then the network g drawn in Figure 1 is a strict Nash network. an incentive to delete the link 2 3.
5. We are now interested in the network with |A| + 4 links which is a candidate to be a Nash network. In this network, player 1 has an incentive to remove the link 1 4. Note that when we set the decay parameter δ i,j = δ i it is easy to show that a Nash network always exists. In this paper we investigate the implications of heterogeneity in the value parameter and decay parameter in the connections model. We find that both types of heterogeneity are similar to cost heterogeneity in models of full transitivity, i.e. they increase the size of strict Nash networks to the maximum possible and can lead to non-existence of Nash networks. Moreover, value heterogeneity in the connections model is different from value heterogeneity in the full transitivity model where it does not dramatically increase the size of strict Nash networks, nor does it lead to non-existence. Cost heterogeneity however has the same type of effect both in models of full and partial transitivity.
